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Corporate accelerator programs (CAPs) are company-supported, cohort-based programs for a 
limited period of time, that support startups through manifold types of resources. They are 
operated by corporations to achieve competitive advantage in a fast-changing economic 
environment and are a relatively recent phenomenon. As a result, the research on the efficacy 
and key success criteria of CAPs is highly important. Past research has identified nine success 
factors (implementation capability, networking, selection criteria, value proposition, target 
definition, top management support, mentor selection, mutual value, prior knowledge) on a 
nominal scale. However, it remains unclear if one is more or less important than the other. To 
close this gap in research a multiple case-study was performed interviewing eight top managers 
of corporate accelerator programs, four for each category, (strategic & investment) to rank the 
success factors according to their expert opinion on an ordinal scale. In this process two 
additional success factors (reputation and local proximity) were identified. Subsequently all 
eleven factors were examined to determine whether they would give the incumbent company a 
sustainable competitive advantage or not, through a resource-based view. The study finds that 
three of eleven success factors under study (selection criteria, networking and implementation 
capability) are able to create a sustained competitive advantage for the incumbent company for 
both types of programs although in different order. Lastly, recommendations were given on 
how a general program could be optimized both on a high level as well as through tangible 
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Título: "Em quais fatores de sucesso os programas de aceleradores corporativos 
devem se concentrar para alcançar vantagem competitiva sustentada para sua 
empresa incumbente? 
Autor: Tobias Kummle 
Os programas aceleradores corporativos (CAPs) são programas apoiados por empresas, 
baseados em coortes por um período limitado de tempo, que dão suporte a startups através de 
vários tipos de recursos. Eles são operados por empresas para alcançar vantagem competitiva 
em um ambiente econômico em rápida mudança e são um fenômeno relativamente recente. 
Como resultado, a pesquisa sobre a eficácia e os principais critérios de sucesso dos CAPs é 
muito importante. Estudos anteriores identificaram nove factores de sucesso (capacidade de 
implementação, ligação em rede, critérios de selecção, proposta de valor, definição de 
objectivos, apoio à gestão de topo, selecção de mentores, valor mútuo, conhecimentos prévios) 
numa escala nominal. No entanto, continua a não ser claro se um é mais ou menos importante 
do que o outro. Para preencher essa lacuna na pesquisa, um estudo de caso múltiplo foi realizado 
entrevistando oito gestores de topo de programas aceleradores corporativos, quatro para cada 
categoria (estratégica e de investimento) para classificar os fatores de sucesso de acordo com 
sua opinião especializada em uma escala ordinal. Nesse processo, dois fatores de sucesso 
adicionais (reputação e proximidade local) foram identificados. Posteriormente, todos os onze 
fatores foram examinados para determinar se dariam à empresa incumbente uma vantagem 
competitiva sustentável ou não, através de uma visão baseada em recursos. O estudo conclui 
que três dos onze factores de sucesso em estudo (critérios de selecção, rede e capacidade de 
implementação) são capazes de criar uma vantagem competitiva sustentada para a empresa 
incumbente em ambos os tipos de programas, embora em ordem diferente. Por último, foram 
dadas recomendações sobre como um programa geral poderia ser optimizado tanto a um nível 
elevado como através de exemplos tangíveis (por exemplo, desinvestir na definição de 
objectivos em favor da selecção de mentores). 
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1. Introduction 
“Industries are changing in the blink of an eye. How can companies keep up?” (World 
Economic Forum 2016, Kupp et al, 2017). 
The exponential rate change (economic and social) demands corporations to constantly seek 
out new ways of doing things, new approaches to the market or even new ventures to pursue. 
Innovation is key to the continued success and competitive advantage (Tohidi, 2012; 
Urbancová, 2013). To meet the challenges of change, corporations must screen outside to seek 
out new ideas and use them to adjust their core business in order to meet those challenges 
(Weiblen & Chesborough, 2015; Kupp et al, 2017). 
The greatest challenge to established corporations is driven by technological innovation and 
digitalization. In the past, only the very largest corporations had the resources to fund cost 
intensive research programs, for instance Volkswagen ($13 bn), Alphabet ($16 bn) and 
Samsung ($14 bn), while in comparison the R&D spending of the country of Sweden was only 
$4 bn in the same year.  Nowadays, two people working in a back-room can challenge industry 
giants and large corporate can no longer be assured of their markets, when a new concept or 
business model is launched. These include innovative startups such as Uber, which undercuts 
traditional taxi firms by enabling customers to book rides with private persons and pay with an 
app on their smartphones or Airbnb, which enables private citizens to rent their personal homes 
as holiday lets, thus in one initiative undercutting the hotel industry. In ten years, Airbnb has 
achieved four million listings in 191 countries that now exceeds the combined total of the five 
biggest hotel brands (Zervas et al, 2017).  
To learn from these examples of innovative lateral thinking (De Bono, 1970) large firms are 
increasingly seeking out startup ventures to support, where the product or service model is 
congruent with the incumbents’ core business. From this point, corporations will either 
strategically absorb the innovation within its own portfolio and develop it or alternatively 
capitalise on the startup, in which it already holds equity, and finance it to generate ROI. This 
is what Chesborough (2003) refers to when firms adopt an Open Innovation Strategy (OIS) in 
which the firm utilises its own resources of infrastructure to provide office space, services and 
personnel to mentor and nurture startups. In this way, the innovation model is developed and 
combined with external innovators and new business entrepreneurs. Corporations working with 
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OIS very often operate within emerging technologies and seek related products for development 
(Kohler, 2016). Both approaches are present in the corporate accelerator model.  
Accelerator programs were developed largely after the 2008 recession as a consequence of the 
downturn in investment funds, which are normally the available finance to new ventures and 
include angel investors and incubators (Hoffman & Radojevich-Kelley, 2012). What large 
corporations required was a more cost effective, simplified model of investment in startups 
(Weiblen & Chesborough, 2015). Startups can be defined as companies in the first stage of 
operations with the attempt to capitalize by developing a new product or service for which they 
believe there is demand (Wiklund et al, 2011). Accelerators, including private, corporate and 
non-profit ones differ from other models such as incubation in offering a time-limited format, 
during which the innovation will either demonstrate its value for further investment or be 
recognised as a business idea which is not worth pursuing (Cohen, 2013). As such the model 
encourages new ideas and allows for brief-time, limited cost experimentation that might 
otherwise wastefully absorb corporate investment.   
The accelerator model provides an exclusive opportunity for the corporation to assess 
innovations and identify possibilities for long-term growth (Kohler, 2016). Furthermore, by 
launching multiple startups at the same time, there is commonality, competition and the time 
parameters are clear. Office-space, mentoring and seed finance are provided and the normally 
three month’s trial ends with a ‘Demo Day’ where the accelerator presents their portfolio for 
judgement. The model assumes high pressure working driven by enthusiasm and ways of 
working that might differ from those within the incumbent company. It fosters commitment and 
the opportunity to deliver on ideas, while it offers for the corporation, in case of an early failure 
of a startup, the opportunity to shift their investment into more viable and profitable ventures 
(Cohen, 2013).  
However, despite the increasing use of corporate accelerator programs (hereafter, CAP) 
relatively little research about this phenomenon is available. Bauer (2016) states that knowledge 
about success factors and how corporations should design their corporate accelerator programs 
to optimise their value is still incipient. This gap can be attributed to the brief timeframe, since 
it is a very recent phenomenon. In addition, difficulties in empirical research arise since 
privately funded accelerators are not obliged to publish its findings and experience to the public, 
which limits the number of available research reports (Dempwolf et al, 2014).  
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This research is intended to address this gap and to contribute to the body of literature by 
conducting a multiple case study among 8 corporate accelerator top managers engaged in 
accelerator development, for both, financial and strategic purposes. It seeks to identify and 
confirm the success factors and to create a ranking of their importance, whereby the incumbent 
company’s objectives can be met. Furthermore, a general design configuration for achieving 
success and a competitive advantage will be discussed and a suggestion is derived to provide 
corporate accelerator managers guidance for making design choices.  
The dissertation begins with a review of existing academic literature on corporate accelerator 
programs before setting out the research methodology, results, discussion and drawing together 
primary and secondary research to answer the research question:  
“On which success factors should corporate accelerator programs focus to achieve 
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2. Academic Literature Review 
This review will begin with an elaboration of the accelerator concept (2.1), examining the 
objectives of the corporately funded and supported accelerator model (2.2) and explaining its 
different categories (2.3). Afterwards the resource-based view methodology is introduced (2.4). 
Finally, the success factors known to literature are explained (2.5) before a conclusion is drawn 
which legitimizes the research question (2.6).  
2.1. Introduction to the concept of accelerator 
According to Hochberg more than 3 000 accelerators were active in 2016. The first accelerator, 
Ycombinator, was founded in the US in 2005 and was followed by, Plug & Play, TechStars and 
500 Startups (Bauer, 2016; Hochberg, 2016). The model was subsequently extended into 
Europe and then globally. A corporate accelerator is the mechanism by which new, small startup 
ventures can be given assistance (Pauwels et al, 2016) through the provision of office space, 
mentoring advice and seed financing (Radojevich & Hoffman, 2012; Kohler, 2016). 
Digitalization has reduced startup costs and the seed financing required to launch a new venture 
(Kupp et al, 2017). The process begins with an open call period, followed by the screening and 
selection of the startups, through which the most viable and congruent startups are identified 
(Pauwels et al., 2016).  
Accelerators provide several benefits such as mentoring and office space for a pre-fixed and 
finite duration (Fishback et al, 2015). The average duration of a CAP is limited to 3 months 
providing a finite period where resources and energy can be concentrated and ensuring an early 
evaluation of the viability of the proposed innovation (Cohen & Hochberg, 2014; Weiblen & 
Chesborough, 2015; Bauer. 2016; Hochberg, 2016). The argument against longer duration is 
the possible risk of mutual dependency between accelerator and startup, which might emerge 
over time, thus the initial drive decreases (Kohler, 2016). Short duration programs also limit 
expenditure upon any startup which enables the CAP to broaden its portfolio and retain the 
capital to assist more ventures.  
The other argument for programs is to arrive at a recognised end point, which is normally the 
Demo Day, opening the opportunity for participants to present their pitch in front of key 
decision makers. It acts as a quality gate for the success or failure of the idea and enables 
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corporate decision makers to decide whether further investment is justifiable or whether the 
venture cannot deliver the value that is required and should be discharged (Cohen, 2013).  
The function of the corporate accelerator is to encourage and support and to decide which 
startups can best meet the corporation’s strategic requirements. The role of a CAP is to 
incorporate the new initiative within its own portfolio and to further decide, whether to support 
it through equity investment, which presumes some commonalities of the product or market, or 
whether to choose the startup only on the basis of its capability to generate capital, thus as an 
investment proposition. The latter one does not necessarily require a linkage to the parent 
corporation’s core business (Hochberg, 2016).   
Corporate accelerators report only to the incumbent company’s board, which is often reluctant 
to have evaluations of its new ventures placed in the public domain (Pauwels, 2015; Kohler, 
2016) while non-profit organisations are responsible to a board of trustees or to government 
bodies, such as the German Ministerium for Business and Energy (Ministerium für Wirtschaft 
und Energie) or, to give a specific example, the Canadian Technology Accelerator to the 
Canadian Government. The corporate accelerator sector is also more recent with Citrix, 
Microsoft and Telefonica in 2011 amongst the first to support external startups with the 
intention of internalising the best ventures into their portfolio (Weiblen & Chesborough, 2015; 
Kanbach, 2016). The corporate accelerator initiative has been spread so rapidly and widely that 
according to Desai (2016) citing the Corporate Accelerator Database, 80 programs in 27 
countries were already active, while Future Asia cited more than 120 (Heinemann, 2016). 
CAPs offer the valuable opportunity for corporations to identify potentially beneficial 
initiatives and to obtain equity at the seed stage, although in only the most promising cases it is 
larger than a very basic funding (Hoffman & Radojevich-Kelley, 2012). Corporate accelerator 
programs exist in several forms, which can involve the entering into private and non-profit 
models by offering executive expertise or contracting with these accelerators to outsource or 
establish its own independent model as at Citrix and Microsoft (Hochberg, 2016).  
In most cases the orientation of the startup is aligned with the corporation’s existing products 
and services, thus the startup provides a different way of addressing the market or offer an 
extension of what it already has (Weiblen & Chesborough, 2015). Resources in services, as 
people and facilities, originate from the corporation. Unlike private accelerators where a small 
equity is held, for CAPs the ownership ratio is much higher. However, in several cases startups 
can be seeded by the corporation for eventual incorporation or nurtured to develop into a 
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separate entity. Figure 1 exemplifies the connections between those parties engaged upon an 
accelerator program. 
 
Figure 1: Relationship of Agents within an Accelerator Program (Bauer, 2016) 
 
2.2. Objectives of corporate accelerator programs 
Corporate accelerators identify, support and ultimately select startup ventures for collaboration 
on innovation or absorption into the corporation or for an investment. This process may be done 
in-house or outsourced, but the key objective is to secure best value ventures (Kohler, 2016). 
Within this model corporation objectives and design choices determine, which startups are 
selected and how they are developed (Kanbach, 2016). Two primary objectives are in play. 
These are the strategic and the financial objective of the program and the organization structures 
supporting the specific objective.  
The program focuses are firstly, internal vs. external focus of opportunity in terms of where the 
startup is placed in relation to the CAP. Secondly, exploration vs. exploitation, as the startup 
venture is identifying market opportunity or a source of ROI within itself and lastly a specific 
and tightly limited or broad industry focus, which is the extent of equity held by the corporation 
and the stage of the initiative, whether it is in its early or later stages (Kanbach, 2016).  
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With regard to the two primary objectives the corporation can be led by financial or strategic 
motivations. The former the corporation is investigating investment opportunities, that may be 
congruent with the corporation’s primary focus of achieving a high ROI. This objective is based 
on the principle, that the startup ventures will increase in value through the provision of 
mentoring and seed financing (Kupp et al, 2017). Strategic objectives are wider with the 
assumption, that the startup innovation can be added to the corporation’s existing portfolio and 
that it is congruent with its value proposition. The startup might provide research into market 
trends that can be acted upon and the product and services offered by the startup will improve 
through participation in the CAP. From this it can be absorbed into the corporation’s value 
chain. Lastly the startup can be a test place for products that cannot be tested within the existing 
corporation business model. It describes a way of trying out new potentials to substantiate 
existing activities (Cohen, 2013).   
A subtler strategic objective is to use the startup to influence the internal processes and 
corporate culture of the parent corporation, although there is to date relatively little research 
into the cultural impact of CAPs (Kanbach, 2016). The assumption is, that the successful startup 
can rejuvenate a corporation, enhance its image both internally and externally, and attract new 
talent (Kohler, 2016). Furthermore, by nesting the startup with the corporate cultures, 
entrepreneurship within the parent can be encouraged and the startup can help to create an 
image of innovation and agility.  
It also provides a broader market overview and gives an early warning and better understanding 
of products that might disrupt the market. If large taxi firms had worked with app developers 
to create their own local digital market, the Uber penetration would have been considerably less 
and most probably the quality of local taxi firms would have been increased. Also, CAPs can 
help to identify and close market gaps, through collaborating with the startup, that develops a 
product or service that can then be constructed and marketed through the parent corporation 
(Dempwolf et al, 2014; Kanbach, 2016; Kohler, 2016).  
 
2.3. Categorization of corporate accelerator programs  
The Objectives of a program determine the model of corporate accelerator chosen for which 
Kanbach (2016) offers a categorization that identifies four types of CAP. One is focused more 
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closely towards the financial dimension, the others towards the strategic. The strategic models 
are called the listening post, the value chain investor and the test laboratory. 
The listening post is a mean of investigating market trends and developments. The startup 
provides access to information “out there” and is seen as a device that can be used to identify 
and screen technologies, not only that can benefit the corporation, but also those that have the 
potential to disrupt its activities. It does not prioritise financial goals in the near future.  
The value chain investor demands an equity investment, because the purpose is to identify, 
develop and integrate products into the corporate value chain. 
Equity investment is also required in the test laboratory model, where the function is to create 
an environment that is innovative, which can assist in developing both external and internal 
innovations but with the advantage of working in connection with the corporation, but “outside 
it” (Kanbach, 2016). 
The only financial corporate accelerator model identified by Kanbach (2016) is the unicorn 
hunter. In this example, the firm makes multiple investments in startup ventures with the 
intention of determining, which of these are financially profitable and to increase their value 
through the input they provide. This is both, directly financial, as equity and as loans, but also 
retains a strategic dimension, through mentorship and access to professional development 
programs shared with the parent corporation. The unicorn is the financial premium to be gained 
when a successful venture has been promoted. Thus, Kanbach ’s (2016) model sub-divides 
CAPs into those that are strategically focused and those that are financially oriented. This 
categorization will be continued into the primary research and each group will be investigated 
separately.1 
 
2.4. The Resource-Based View 
The resource-based perspective or view (RBV) argues that companies can attain and retain 
competitive advantage by the intelligent use of their strategic resources, whether these are 
tangible as material or intangible as personnel, skills and potential. The value of supporting 
startups that offer the opportunity to identify and leverage resources is evident. Resources are 
                                               
In style of Ostertag (2017) the financial focused programs will be referred to as investment vehicles instead. 
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inputs (tangible and intangible) that can be transformed into products and services that will 
result in an economic rent (Black & Boal, 1994). The mere existence of resources is not 
sufficient, they must be used intelligently and strategically (Penrose, 1959) and they also 
encompass trade contracts, brand names, capital, technological know-how and the skill of 
employees (Wernerfield, 1987).  
Competitive advantage is achieved (Porter, 2008) when a corporation institutes value creating 
actions or exploits existing value by creating resources, which their competitors cannot match. 
Sustainable competitive advantage is achieved when competitors are unable to match those 
resources and secure adequate value and market parity. Barney (1991) argues that secured 
competitive advantage needs to be heterogeneous. This implies that the materials or skilled 
workforce are in short supply and cannot be replicated (Peteraf, 1991). Imperfectly mobile 
resources are those, that cannot be relocated except at uneconomic cost or cannot be substituted 
except by accruing heavy development costs. As defined by Barney, where resources are 
valuable, and they are manipulated strategically and intelligently, a corporation can achieve 
competitive advantage. 
The value of the corporate accelerator within the RBV model is that it is constantly seeking out 
innovations, new products, new processes and harnessing enthusiasm and skill through multiple 
startup businesses which it supports and mentors. It provides the dynamic capability by which 
the firm can leverage innovation to enhance its internal and external capabilities to achieve 
competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). In addition to the value that accrues from 
the absorption of the successful startup, enhancing the skills of corporation mentors can also 
add value to the next cohort of ventures.  
The RBV is the appropriate framework to analyse the CAP, because of its structural approach, 
which focuses on unique resources, and demands the continual examination and development 
of processes, that deliver cost efficiencies and greater value (Miller & Ross, 2003).  
In order to exemplify the relevance of the RBV to this argument, the following questions must 
be addressed: 
1. Is a given resource or capability valuable? 
2. Is it heterogeneously distributed across competing firms? 
3. Is it imperfectly mobile?  
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Barney (1991), working from within the RBV framework, argues that sustained competitive 
advantage is achieved, when each of these questions can be affirmed. The process through 
which this matter is determined and the impact of these towards a competitive advantage, both 
temporary and sustained are demonstrated by Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Adapted from Mata et. al. 1995 
 
The value of innovation is also a way of extending market with the goal to achieve sustained 
competitive advantage (Urbancová, 2013). Startups may be able to indicate, like the listening 
post, value chain investor and even the test laboratory (Kanbach, 2016) that innovation can 
create a competitive advantage by showing new market opportunities, which have been ignored 
before (Porter, 2008). Corporate accelerators invite participating startups and entrepreneurs to 
collaborate with the corporation and to benefit from its equity investment and/or services, that 
startups are lacking but need for its success. This engagement would under other circumstances, 
due to the high cost and risk, not be undertaken at this early stage (Hochberg, 2016).  
The startup, monitored and assisted by the CAP, is assessed for its innovation and its capability 
to impact the value chain, whether this is through new processes, new products or new 
customers. The benefit a CAP can bring to a corporation and the accompanying investment in 
it can be justified by its role as a part of a corporate strategy. That incorporates the purpose of 
enhancing its value chain and economic rents, its ROI and technological developments (Valente 
et al, 2015). From within the RBV perspective CAP’s earn their value by indicating which paths 
the incumbent company should be travelling to achieve sustainable competitive advantage and 
which paths should be rejected, due to the risk of losing market share (Cohen, 2013).  
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2.5. Success factors of corporate accelerator programs in current literature 
In scientific research it is widely discussed and still remains unclear, if appropriate selection 
criteria are essential in deciding which startups should be incorporated within a CAP cohort 
(Radojevich-Kelley & Hoffman, 2012; Bauer, 2016; Kohler, 2016; Kanbach, 2017). The use of 
strategic objectives obviously aligns the startup more closely towards the corporation, since 
otherwise promising startups may be excluded from the CAP simply because they do not offer 
added value to the corporation’s core business, while they might do to another.  
Firstly, the CAP must deliver real value towards the startups, thus the startup can benefit from 
the program. If this is not given the program will be short-term and will not attract promising 
startups (Kanbach, 2016; Weiblen 2015). 
Additionally, clear objectives and deliverables are required to prevent the loss of sight of the 
CAP's goal and lastly, agreed and transparent procedures must be in place by which the process 
can be monitored and evaluated (Kohler, 2016).  
Kohler (2016) also stresses the importance of the relationship between the startup and the CAP 
in achieving success, not only in terms of the provision of resources, but in the interaction and 
interplay of people, culture and ideas. How transparent is the corporation and the startup? 
Success demands that both parties derive mutual benefit from the interaction and that their goals 
are congruent. The key component, as far as Kohler (2016) is concerned, is the availability of 
expert advice, whether this is provided from within the corporation or from external sources. 
Appropriate and effective mentorship, able to access expert opinion and the transparencies of 
both CAP and startup to authentic exchange information of relevant market and business 
knowledge is also very important (Kanbach, 2016). As part of this process, the direct startup 
experience and expertise about entrepreneurship of the CAP management team is key to 
success. The more startup experience the (corporate) management team has, the greater is the 
CAP managers’ learning, and utilising this knowledge internally in the corporation, the more 
likely is an increased success in the future. Success in previous projects leads to more success, 
as managers gain in experience and confidence. These strengths will be passed on to the startups 
(Wise & Valliere, 2014).  
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The CAP, and therefore also the startup ventures that it nurtures and supports, requires total 
commitment from senior management. The CAP needs to be seen as an integral investment in 
extending core capabilities and not as an indulgence that can be discharged when there is an 
economic downturn (Dempwolf et al, 2014). Short-term horizons that have queried the value 
of investment in research and development (R&D) when facing an economic downturn 
invariably have decayed the opportunity to achieve or maintain competitive advantage. The 
growth of CAPs since the recession of 2008 owes a great deal to the need for finite cost and 
time limited prototypes, where companies can decide within a few months whether the idea is 
worth pursuing or not (Cohen, 2013). 
A final benefit to be gained from startup participation in CAPs is the opportunity to cross-foster 
ideas and models through networking, both from within the corporation and with other startup 
ventures participating in this CAP cohort or beyond, such as previous participants. It is using 
informal and quasi-social constructs and networks to accumulate knowledge, inform and 
advertise and to create synergy through the cross-foster of ideas. But to be fully effective this 
must extend to all participants including startups, mentors and the CAP management so that: 
“the active involvement within the startup ecosystem of all members of the accelerator team is 
considered an important responsibility” (Kanach, 2016, p. 1773).  
Table 1 provides a tabular typology of success factors and related research papers, offering a 
comprehensive survey of the research and citing each of the identified success criteria. 
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Table 1: Success Factors for the incumbent company identified in current literature 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
What becomes evident from the literature is the complexity of factors that impact the success 
of the corporate accelerator programs, while not all of these are relevant for both types of 
programs (Kanbach, 2016). To date the level of importance of each success factor remains 
Success Factor Explanation Source
Selection Criteria
Clear determination of the selection criteria for the startups 
in the selection process. Tailor-made selection criteria 
based on strategic objectives of the company lead to higher 
success rates.
Radojevich-Kelley & 
Hoffman, 2012; Kohler, 
2016
Value proposition
Clear value proposition of the company towards the 
startup. The companies need to recognize the value they 
can bring to a startup, who alternatively have access to 
independent VC´s and Incubators.
Weiblein & Chesbrough, 
2015; Kanbach & Stubner, 
2016
Target definition
A clear definition of the expected output and objectives of 
the program the company wants to achieve through their 
engagement with startups. An unclear definition might lead 
to diffuse activities and an unclear value proposition.  
Weiblein & Chesbrough, 




The capability to implement the procedures to assure the 
creation and the development of innovation throughout and 
after the program and its integration into the core business.
Weiblein & Chesbrough, 
2015
Mutual value
The relationship between the corporation and startups and 
the consequential interplay between processes, people and 
the place. This collaboration needs to combine the interest 
of the startups and the corporation to create mutual value.
Kohler, 2016
Mentor selection
The right choice of expert involved to mentor the startups 
to combine business knowledge with fresh startup 
perspectives. The team of experts should consist of 
internal and external experts with mixed work experience, 
different business perspectives and understanding of the 
startup ecosystem.
Kohler, 2016; Kanbach & 
Stubner, 2016
Prior knowledge
The level of direct startup experience of the accelerator 
manager-team has a significant impact on the success of an 
accelerator program and consequentially on the 
participating startups.
Wise & Vallierie, 2014
Top management 
support
Support and commitment of the top management team to 
ensure the sustainability and the effectiveness of the 
program as well as supporting the acceptance and 
credibility of the program across the company.
Kanbach & Stubner, 2016
Networking
Networking at events or conferences and an active 
involvement into the startup ecosystem to attract promising 
startups and skilled founders.
Kanbach & Stubner, 2016
14 | Page 
 
unclear. The aim of this work therefore is to identify and confirm the success factors and create 
a ranking of their importance based on experts’ opinions. Additionally, it will be investigated 
how and if the importance of success factors is different between the two types of programs 
(strategic vs. financial). Depending on these results it will be evaluated where current programs 
should increase their efforts (resource input) to achieve a sustained competitive advantage for 
the incumbent firm (Porter, 2008). These targets translate into following research question: 
On which success factors should corporate accelerator programs focus to achieve sustained 
competitive advantage for its incumbent company? 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Research Approach 
As already explained in the Introduction, this is a recent topic of research, what might be 
anticipated from the relative newness of the CAP model and the superiority in numbers and 
presence of for-profit accelerators, which are less ready to publish reports about their activities 
creating a lack of primary evidence. The absence of pre-existing academic research justifies an 
inductive approach by which multiple modes of investigation, such as small-case-studies, can 
generate data from which propositions can be developed for further research (Dawson, 2009). 
The multiple case study approach is most adequate when the phenomenon being investigated 
is not yet fully formulated and the boundary between the subject of study and the context within 
which it operates remains unclear and permeable (Yin, 2014). Such an empirical research is 
capable of developing the necessary “how” and “why” questions through which new theories 
ultimately are developed to explain the mechanisms of its operation and potential outcomes 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The primary research is intended to build upon and extend the insights acquired through the 
literature review, which has provided the direction of research. Disparities in success levels 
between CAPs is widely acknowledged (Bauer, 2016; Kohler, 2016; Hochberg, 2016). 
The importance of the RBV concept has been underlined (Wernerfield, 1984; Barney, 1991). 
CAP’s are to leverage the startups they are supporting and secure and maintain competitive 
advantage. The CAP, particularly the strategic, offers the opportunity to enact RBV activities 
and develop value enhancing strategies and secure competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984; 
Barney, 1991;Porter, 2008). 
 
3.2. Explanation of Research Approach 
Following from the literature review the initial data gathering exercise was conducted through 
an unstructured ground clearing interview with a business expert of the Volkswagen AG in 
order to assure a corporation’s motives in establishing a CAP, reconfirming the practical 
relevance of the research topic and to create a holistic overview about CAP in general. In 
addition to the interview an unstructured interview with a project manager of Banco Santander 
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InnoVentures in London, UK was performed to confirm the relevance of the research question 
by a second source.  
After that, secondary data was studied on the corporate accelerator database www.corporate-
accelerator.net (Heinemann, 2016) upon which a broad range of CAPs, their objectives and the 
respective websites are listed. Diving deeper into the programs on this list in the public domain, 
the CAP’s websites and presentations, annual reports of the parent companies and other 
business information about the programs (e.g. Crunchbase) were synthesized for data 
triangulation, which “entails using more than one method or source of data in the study of 
social phenomena” (Bryman, 2012, p. 392), to end up with a list of possible CAPs for inclusion 
into the dataset.  
The areas of research included corporation objectives, the relevance of CAPs to the resource-
based view on competitive advantage (Barney, 1991) and success factors. Using the secondary 
data just mentioned and the discussed literature a filter was constructed to provide 
inclusion/exclusion criteria to assure comparability of the programs for a robust analysis. Only 
CAP’s that fulfilled the following criteria were considered for further analysis through case 
studies. These validation criteria were following:  
1. The CAP had been established to assist the corporation’s main function and not solely 
as a vehicle for launching startup ventures, 
2. the program was cohort based, 
3. it was brief and finite, 
4. it lasted 10-14 weeks and ended in a Demo Day, 
5. it had to incorporate startups that were capable of supporting at least one full time 
employee, 
6. host corporation resources, such as mentorship and infrastructure (e.g. office space), 
were made available for the startups. 
The shortened or filtered list now consisted of all CAPs that were comparable and suitable to 
answer the research question. This list represents a possible portfolio for case study analysis. 
Eisenhardt (1989) argues that once the case study portfolio has been constructed the next stage 
is an iterative one, in which commonalities and groupings are arrived at.  
As identified in literature (Ostertag, 2017) and confirmed in the exploratory study with a 
representative of the Volkswagen AG it can be distinguished between two CAP orientations: 
the “investment vehicle”, identifying those ventures into which the corporation might invest 
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with the expectation, that it would deliver a financial premium in form of an enhanced ROI, 
and the “strategic vehicle” with the objective to identify and foster high potential products and 
services of startups with a projected outcome leading to the extension of the corporation’s 
product and services portfolio. To provide a clear definition for this thesis every program that 
requires the startup to give up a stake of equity in order to participate (upfront) will be 
categorized as an investment vehicle, in line with (Kanbach 2016; Weiblen 2015; Ostertag 
2017). The remainder will be considered strategic. 
According to Hoffman & Radojevich-Kelley (2012) the number to deliver reliable and valid 
outcomes would be three interviews for each segment. In this thesis four case studies were 
selected for in-depth analysis for each of the two segments to answer the research question 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2014). 
 
3.3. Data Collection 
The interviewee respondents were identified through social- and business networking by the 
snowball technique (Goodman, 2011). This method enables the researcher to access 
respondents capable of providing valuable and specific insights, rather than delivering 
redundancy through generalisation and to go straight to a person whom their colleagues had 
already defined as being a key potential contributor to the research (Arber, 2001). The division 
of CAPs, through the findings from the secondary research, into “investment vehicles” and 
“strategic vehicles” demanded the pursuit of potential correspondents in differing fields. The 
decision was taken to select more than 4 persons from each group in order to allow for no-
shows and short-term cancellations by the interviewees. The final number of interviews was 8, 
four in each group. It was felt important that the two facets of CAPs should be equally 
represented. Table 2 presents the sample of corporate accelerator and its parent corporation that 
fulfilled the criteria and who agreed to be interviewed. In the cases, where the interviewee chose 
the option to give the answers anonymously, only the industry where the parent corporation is 
operating, the location, the year of the program’s foundation and program type is mentioned.  
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Table 2: Sample of corporate accelerators in the data set (eight CAP’s) 
 
Each respondent was approached by e-mail or the social network “LinkedIn” and has been 
explained the purpose of the interview. This was followed by a telephone call during which the 
personal fit and the appropriateness for interview was established. All respondents were top 
managers and, in the position, to develop and lead the CAP and due to this circumstance able 
to give an oversight of the program’s startup cohort. The interviews lasted from 30 – 50 minutes 
and were undertaken by telephone, google hangouts or skype, and recorded with the 
respondent’s permission.  
The semi-structured interview format consisted of questions and discussion points and was 
provided to the respondents several days before the interview to allow time for reflection and 
for respondents to discuss these reflections with colleagues, thus deepening the insights that 
were communicated in the interviews. Respondents were assured of the right to confidentiality 
and anonymity (Bulmer, 2001). The questionnaire used in the process can be seen in Appendix 
2 and Appendix 3. 
 
3.4. Data Analysis 
The transcripts were read multiple times to identify and consider the various possible meanings 
inherent in the text. In order to identify key points and similarities the transcripts were coded 
by applying the open coding practice, which can be described as: “the process of breaking 
down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing data” (Bryman, 2012, p. 569). 
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Initially, each case was first analysed individually, which is referred to as within-case analysis 
(Simmons, 2009), to gain familiarity with the data and to investigate, as unbiased as possible, 
what each respondent identified as factors to his CAP’s success. 
In this process the frequency of statements that described such a success factor, out of the 
expert’s point of view, was used as a proxy for the interviewee’s perception of importance 
regarding this factor. So, if for example an interview partner only mentioned networking as a 
success factor for CAPs ten times this factor would receive 100%, but if he mentioned 
networking twice, the selection criteria for startups to include five times and that it’s important 
for startup and corporate to have a mutual value from the CAP three times the factors would be 
valued at 20%, 50% and 30% respectively, thus reflecting the importance of each success factor 
out of the expert’s point of view. This practise is based on the assumption, that: “On the one 
hand a code is relevant the more often it is mentioned within a single information source. On 
the other hand, a code is important the more information sources contain the respective code.” 
(Keller, 2017, p.1102). 
After these independent analyses, a ranking of the success factors for each category of CAPs 
was created by using the individual ranking values for each factor and calculating the weighted 
mean for each. This follows the purpose to give the statements of interviewees whose programs 
are successful higher importance than those whose CAPs are performing less prosperously. The 
weight used for this calculation depends on the success ratio of the CAP that was mentioned by 
the expert’s in the interviews. For this purpose, a quadratic scale was chosen as weight. It is 
displayed in Table 3. The weighted average importance for each success factor 𝑠𝑓 was then 
calculated as: 
 𝑤𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑠𝑓 =








 𝑣𝑠𝑓,𝑖  is the relative frequency of 𝑠𝑓 for CAP 𝑖 (through the methodology mentioned in the 
paragraph before) and 
 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖 is the score depending on the CAP’s success ratio according to Table 4. 
The sum is calculated over all CAP’s in each group with 𝑛 = 4, both for strategic and financial 
vehicles. The results of this method are two lists of success factors, ranked by experts’ opinions, 
who are determinants of running an effective CAP. 
20 | Page 
 
 
Table 3: Weights applied depending on 25% intervals of success ratio 
 
These lists were used as inputs for the resource-based view analysis, in order to evaluate 
whether these factors also mean a sustained competitive advantage, a temporary competitive 
advantage, no advantage or maybe even a disadvantage to the corporation. A firm’s resources 
in this context are defined as "all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991, p. 101). 
There is no doubt that the success factors identified in literature and through the interviews are 
resources according to this definition. Therefore, each factor in this study is discussed regarding 
its fulfilment of the following three criteria: 
1. Is the resource or capability valuable?  
2. Is it heterogeneously distributed across competing firms (is it rare)?  
3. Is it imperfectly mobile (inimitable)? 
Barney explains that a resource is valuable if it exploits opportunities and/or neutralizes threats 
in a firm’s environment, that a resource is rare if it is not present in a corporation’s current and 
potential competitors and that a resource is inimitable if it can either be imperfectly copied by 
the competition or substituted by other resources that are of equal strategical value and can be 
imitated (Barney, 1991).  
Having investigated this, the ranked list of success factors will be reduced by those, which do 
not lead to a sustained competitive advantage, leaving a ranked list of success factors that do 
so. This will allow to answer the research question and furthermore point out implications. 
For simplicity a summarizing overview of the research methodology applied in this thesis is 
provided though Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Overview of the applied research methodology.   
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4. Results 
In this section the results of the described methodology will be displayed and explained. 
Furthermore, interesting observations are pointed out. The results will be addressed in the 
following discussion section. 
4.1. Individual case studies, importance and ranking of success factors 
The relative frequencies are displayed in percent for each case study and were grouped after 
their type. Each success factor identified in literature (cf. Table 2) is represented and two new 
success factors, reputation and local proximity, were identified in the interviews. Reputation of 
a CAP describes its ability to attract relevant startups to apply for the program by either active 
(i.e. searching and contacting) or passive engagement (i.e. advertisement and/or reputation). As 
the experts put it: 
“Of course, the configuration of the CAP has to be good, but the most important part is to find 
the right startups which can add value.” (Wayra) 
“Yeah and then obviously have top notch startups. Be seen by all of the stakeholders […] 
Really get the word out […] (SAP.iO) 
“The better our reputation is, the better startups we will attract and the greater BSH's success 
will be.” (BSH) 
This was also mentioned by Wayra, Viessmann, Plug & Play and SAP.iO in the final, open 
question of the interview. They stated that an essential part of their job as CAP manager 
consisted in finding and winning the right startup candidates for their program.  
Local proximity was mentioned by several respondents in the same open question which, in 
their opinion, had a significant impact on success of a CAP (Viessmann, Banking/Plug&Play). 
It describes how geographically close the startup is to the next location of the corporation that 
is open to collaborate with it: 
“The geographic location of the startup ecosystem plays a major point in success”. 
(Viessmann) 
“[…] if you have a corporate accelerator you need to take into account where these 
companies (are) coming from, since it is really hard for corporations to work with startups 
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who are based […] in Silicon Valley. […] We wanted to find startups locally.” 
(Banking/Plug&Play) 
The results of the open-coding scheme, which incorporates statements like these from all 
individual interviews, can be seen in Table 4. Due to limitations in the size of this thesis and to 
assure a more convenient reading flow not all are explained individually.  
 
Table 4: Results of the individual case study analyses showing relative frequencies of the times a success factor was 
mentioned in an interview separated by CAP-type. Each CAP’s success rate as mentioned by the experts is displayed as well. 
 
The results of the individual-case analyses show that different experts, even within the same 
CAP-vehicle, show differences in their perception about which factors are most important, 
judging by the times they mentioned them in the interviews. Since all programs were selected 
to fulfil the set of criteria mentioned in section 3.2 this variation cannot be attributed to the 
programs’ configurations. Differences between the programs are the goals they seek to achieve 
(cf. Appendix 1) with the CAP as well as how good they achieve these goals, measured by the 
success rate (Table 4). Success rate in this context was defined by the ratio of startups who were 
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either successfully integrated into the corporation, whose innovation was integrated into the 
corporation’s value chain or whose shares could be sold at a premium in an exit. All three 
criteria had to happen not later than two years after the startups had left the CAP.  
Obviously, the characteristics of less successful programmes are less desirable, whereas those 
of successful programmes are more desirable. The differences in the characteristics thus allow 
conclusions to be drawn as to what the characteristics of a successful programme should look 
like. The methodology in section 3.4 takes this into account. The results of the weighted success 
factors are therefore able to convey a clearer pattern and to better distinguish between the two 
types of programs. The result of this method is displayed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Each success factor’s importance by CAP-type calculated as quadratic weighted average depending on the CAP’s 
success rate. 
 
The results can be explained by noting that Banking and Wayra had a stronger influence than 
BSH and Viessmann for the investment vehicle cluster. This is the case since the BSH program 
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is running its first cohort and has no data on success rate yet, while Viessmann’s program was 
founded in 2016 but did not disclose this information. Banking put most importance on 
selection criteria followed by value proposition and reputation while Wayra puts its focus on 
the value proposition of the program, the implementation capability and networking (cf. Table 
4). This difference in terms of success ratio cannot directly be attributed to the distribution of 
importance over the success factors, as the programs’ aims differ. Banking seeks insights in 
emerging technologies with a focus on economic returns while Wayra seeks partnerships with 
startups through equity investment (cf. Appendix 1) However, this is compensated somewhat 
as Banking is weighted twice as strongly as is Wayra, thus the results presented in Table 5 for 
investment vehicles still represent this CAP type well. For strategic vehicles the results mostly 
consist of DBS/Nest, Automotive and Grow, while SAP.iO was weighted only lightly since its 
first cohort just launched this year. The first three programs all attributed a large importance to 
the implementation capability followed by selection criteria for DBS/Nest and Grow while 
Automotive sees networking as the second most important factor (cf. Table 4). In this cluster 
all three programs have the same goal which lies in collaboration with the startups to innovate 
and improve the corporation’s business. Hence, the difference in terms of success ratio is 
directly attributable to the distribution of importance over the success factors in this case. 
In consequence the results displayed in Table 5 now incorporate the information about which 
prioritization of success factors/resources lead to more success. When comparing the two types 
of programs a clear difference becomes obvious. The three largest deltas between the two 
vehicles can be found in implementation capability (-13%), reputation (11%) and value 
proposition (10%). The top three most important success factors for investment vehicles are 
selection criteria, value proposition and implementation capability and implementation 
capability, networking and selection criteria for strategic vehicles. These results are 
summarized in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Ranked success factors according to their weighted average importance. 
 
4.2. Resource Based View analysis 
Factors that have an influence on the success of CAPs were identified through literature review 
in chapter 2.5 and briefly explained and summarised in Table 1. Now each success factor is 
analysed in accordance to the RBV definition in order to investigate its impact on 
competitiveness as explained in section 3.4.  
Since the resources under study were identified as success factors and published in peer 
reviewed journals it is obvious that each one is valuable in accordance to Barney’s definition. 
Hence, this criterion was only checked for the two factors that were identified though the case 
studies performed by the author of this work. The remaining criteria (rareness & inimitability) 
are checked for each success factor by using logic, quotes from expert interviews and references 
from literature. Afterwards the results are summarized. 
Selection criteria 
Rareness: This can certainly be confirmed in case of selection criteria for a) strategic- and b) 
investment vehicles. While this might seem counterintuitive at first sight, as all CAPs have 
selection criteria to choose startups for their programs. However, rareness is surely the case as 
all programs under study use individual criteria which differ substantially (both in content and 
number) from their competitors, as the interviews revealed. Additionally, the success of the 
CAP depends on the ability to recruit and select startups that have a good fit with the 
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corporation. Detecting these startups requires specific skills and knowledge, which are rare, 
since it imperatively presupposes specific contextual knowledge about the corporation and the 
strategic intents. Some examples of the interviews confirm the individual processes and criteria: 
“Well then, we do have a pretty rigorous selection process, so, it starts off with a written 
application explaining the value proposition. This must include: the differentiating factors 
and also the legibility of the technology behind it.” (DBS/Nest) 
“[…] we select those startups according to the technical interests and the challenges our 
corporate Partners have. […] We always look what they need, and, on those criteria, we 
choose the startups. Because of this, our failure ratio is very low.” (Banking) 
“We select startups through 33 selection criteria to assure they fit thematically.” 
(Automotive) 
Inimitability: During the individual case interviews it became obvious that each CAP is very 
protective regarding its specific selection criteria. Only the respondent of Automotive stated the 
number of criteria they check (33) before making a decision regarding a startup’s participation 
in the program. For obvious reasons the exact criteria or their number are neither published to 
the competition nor the startups. Reed & DeFillipp argue that “the tacitness, complexity, and 
specificity in a firm's skills and resources can generate causal ambiguity in competency-based 
advantage, and thus raise barriers to imitation” (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990, p.1). Therefore, 
inimitability of this resource can be confirmed.  
All in all, appropriate selection criteria for a CAP are certainly able to deliver a temporary 
competitive advantage and, while the information is safe in the firm, a sustained one as well. 
Value proposition 
Rareness: According to Kohler the value proposition covers the strategic intent of the CAP, 
the way of aligning the corporation’s goals with the startups intentions, the maturity of the 
targeted startups (early- mid-, or late stage), the decision to take equity or not and the scope of 
the innovation challenge (only narrow problem or broader innovation opportunities as well) 
(Kohler, 2016). When looking at Appendix 1 it becomes obvious that the main goals are 
identical for strategic vehicles and very similar for investment vehicles as has been explained 
in section 4.1, thus not being rare. Equity participation is also not rare amongst competitors 
since all investment vehicles do so while all strategic vehicles don’t. Furthermore, during the 
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interviews it was noted that the maturity of the targeted startups is mostly focused on mid- to 
late stage: 
“What I see, the main challenge is that we try to bring later stage startups, because those are 
the startups that banks or corporations want to work with […].” (Banking/Plug&Play) 
 “We have mostly more mature startups. […] But we are a more compact CAP, which means 
we also accept really very early phase startups. From the idea in principle up to a first 
MVP.” (Automotive) 
All in all, three of Kohler’s five parameters that define the value proposition of a CAP, namely 
strategic intent, the startup’s maturity and the equity participation, are not rare. It is therefore 
concluded that the resource value proposition does not provide a competitive advantage. 
Target definition 
Rareness: This would be observed if amongst CAP’s competitors having a clear target 
definition would be rare. On one hand it seems hard to imagine that a corporation would start a 
CAP without knowing what they seek to get out of it. On the other hand, CAP’s have seen 
growth recently and might have become trendy, which is supported by following expert who 
didn’t want to get cited on this statement: 
“You also have to see how the (CAP) model develops. That's quite a hype at the moment. I 
could imagine that we are at the peak of this hype.” (Censored) 
Although, it seems possible that some corporations will seem pressured into launching a CAP 
as a result of a hype, these programs will not be able to last without a clear target definition as 
this is one of the main success factors (Kohler, 2016). Kohler explains that a lack of it will lead 
to diffused activities. This cannot lead to a competitive advantage. Hence rareness is not given.  
Implementation capability 
Rareness: The integration of a startup’s innovation into the corporation is a highly critical point 
in a CAP (Weiblen, 2015). Even amongst directly competing corporations the value chains will 
be different, and as a result the process necessary to implement specific technologies or 
procedures into the value chain will be individual as well. This is the case since the accelerator 
improves the startup’s solution “mainly by leveraging the competencies, resources, and 
networks of the parent company and potential external experts.” (Kanbach, 2016) which are 
rare resources. 
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Inimitable: A competitor that notices his rival’s success and attributes it to his capability to 
implement outside-in innovations through his CAP surely wants to imitate this process. 
However, this task results in a complex transfer-task due to the substantial differences between 
the two corporations and their non-transparency. The organizational structure alone will be 
impossible to understand from a competitor’s point of view since it is not published in such 
detail. This difficulty is expressed by following statement: 
“If you want to take a startup into the CAP you need support from many departments to make 
it a reality.” (Automotive) 
It underlines, that the CAPs are already struggling to implement the innovation because they 
face resistance from departments in their own corporation. The competitor will most certainly 
already struggle with finding this department, not to mention the process of implementation. 
Hence, inimitability is given. 
In conclusion it can be said, that the resource implementation capability leads to a sustained 
competitive advantage for both vehicles. 
Mentor selection 
Rareness: Since mentors have a large influence on success of a CAP it is obvious that every 
corporation selects them on a best effort basis. In that case mentors will be experts in their field, 
whether internal or external to the corporation and show an understanding of the startup 
ecosystem (Kohler, 2016). As this is a very selective job profile it is safe to assume skilled 
mentors are rare amongst competitors, especially since the previous experiences from startup 
activities are unique by nature. 
“Our team is made up of former entrepreneurs, who have already started their own 
businesses and coaches of internal teams to build new business models.” (BSH) 
Inimitability: The selection of the right mentors should however be relatively easy to copy due 
to pragmatic reasons. Nowadays all people who aspire a career maintain a profile on social 
media platforms such as LinkedIn. If a company identifies its CAP is less successful due to 
worse mentoring it should be easy to compare the differences between the mentors and to draw 
conclusions about what good mentors should know and have experience of. This is only valid 
under the premise that there are enough skilled workers available on the market to have one 
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with the required set of skills readily available. However, recall that there are about 100 CAPs 
in existence today, which is why this argument should remain valid. 
In conclusion the resource of a CAP in selecting the right mentor leads to competitive parity 
for both vehicles and to a temporary competitive advantage at best. 
Top management support 
Rareness: Against expectation, this resource turned out to be scarce since the interviews 
revealed, that many CAPs see their program as CSR or R&D and not as part of the corporate 
strategy (Santander). It has been stated, that the program of his company would be the first 
department to be closed when budget problems would arise, which has been specifically warned 
of (Kanbach, 2016). Extrapolating from the data set of this study it is assumed that top 
management support is rare amongst CAPs. 
Inimitability: If a competitor is successful because of top management support it seems 
plausible that the competing firm’s top management would recognize this and take measures. 
These would mean supporting their own CAP more, which after having realized its benefit 
though the competitor’s advantage, could be achieved quickly. Therefore, inimitability is not 
present for this resource. 
All in all, a CAP’s resource of having top management’s support leads to a temporary 
competitive advantage but will in the long run, when every CAP has top management support, 
lead to competitive parity for both vehicles. 
Networking 
Rareness: Networking activities are broadly established and performed by every CAP. It must 
be pointed out however, that every firm and every program has its own, individual network to 
VC’s, Angel Investors, Customers, Suppliers and other Stakeholders. While this is a soft 
indication for scarcity of this resource the interviews revealed that for a) strategic vehicles 
networking between the company’s departments and branches plays a major role in a CAP’s 
capability to implement the innovation from startups (Automotive, SAP.iO). For b) investment 
vehicles this argument is invalid since an exit is the favoured outcome. Since startups are unique 
by definition and consequently require unique contacts as well, it is argued that an investment 
vehicle’s network is rare since it is not present in the same configuration in competing CAPs. 
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Inimitability: Picking up on the last argument made it can be concluded, that the possibility to 
imitate a CAP’s unique networking capabilities is very low. Not only would it require to know 
which contacts would be the right ones for the startup, but also entail having established a good 
relationship beforehand of needing to rely on it. Furthermore, networks are a dynamic process 
that is subject to constant change. It seems impossible to copy a resource with such 
characteristics. On top of that, the networking efforts of a CAP depend on the startups maturity. 
Hence the network has to be in the right form at the right time in order to be of value for the 
startup. A competitor who would try to copy a CAP’s network would always lag behind and 
probably not be able to catch up. This logic applies to both types of vehicles and results in 
affirmation of inimitability for this resource. 
In conclusion superior networking capabilities of a CAP deliver a temporary competitive 
advantage and most probably, if the competition is unable to build a suitable network, a 
sustainable competitive advantage as well, for both vehicles. 
Reputation 
Value: The value of this resource lies in the exploitation of the opportunity to optimize the fit 
between CAP and the startup cohort. The more startups apply as a result of higher reputation, 
the better can the CAP select. This should furthermore result in a better alignment of interests 
between CAP and cohort, which in turn leads to a more efficient usage of the CAP’s resources 
since synergies will be maximized. This is underlined by the trend of CAPs to attract startups 
with free offerings (Weiblen, 2015). 
Rareness: This would be given if it would be rare amongst competitors to have a good 
reputation, meaning it would be rare to attract relevant startups. However, this can be negated 
since excess demand for accelerator programs can be observed, which is reflected in the low 
acceptance rate of these programs which on average is about 3% (Miller & Bound, 2011). The 
fact that a competitor has a good reputation does not mean that another competitor can’t build 
up a good reputation as well, especially since given this excess demand he will have many 
chances to do so. 
All in all, the reputation of a CAP does not lead to a competitive advantage.  
Local proximity 
Value: An opportunity that comes from local proximity is the concentration of startups and 
helps to increase synergies (Viessmann, Banking/Plug&Play). Additionally, many companies 
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want to keep things local and shy away from distant startups (e.g. Japanese companies and 
startups from the valley) (Banking/Plug&Play). A company with the resource local proximity 
can engage in more relationships with startups. This directly reduces the threat of missing out 
on interesting startups for the program. This argument holds true for both CAP-vehicles. 
Rareness: How rare this resource is, obviously depends on the location. While many CAP’s 
have an office in Palo Alto or other startup hubs like Berlin, offices in Kassel for example are 
rarer. In the first case the benefit of a high startup concentration should be somewhat 
compensated through the high concentration of competitors, while this won’t be the case in 
Kassel. Rareness for this resource therefore depends on the location and is not given for the 
major startup hubs and the CAP’s interviewed in this study. 
Inimitability: If rareness is given in any chance a competitor can easily decide to adapt by 
opening an office at the desired location, too. Therefore, inimitability is to be denied for this 
resource. 
All in all, the resource of local proximity leads to competitive parity and in rare cases to a 
temporary competitive advantage. 
 
Applying the results of this analysis to the ranked success factors identified in the previous 
section in accordance to the methodology (cf. Figure 3, p. 21) the success factors can now be 
filtered after their ability to generate a sustained or temporary competitive advantage. Note, that 
the factors mutual value and prior knowledge were not assessed in this section since the expert 
interviews didn’t reveal if these resources were rare or not. To assure robust results in this work 
the conservative assumption was made that they are not. The results are summarized in Table 
7. It stands out that only three of the eleven factors under study are capable of providing a 
sustained competitive advantage while two more provide a temporary one. These findings are 
quite in line with the expert’s valuation regarding their importance.  
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Table 7: Summary of the RBV-analysis’ results segmented by category. 
 
The findings show that it matters whether the CAPs goal is strategic or financial as this will 
have implication on the resources that mangers perceive as supporting the success of the 
program. Taking a look at Table 6 it is interesting to verify and try to make plausible why the 
rankings show their respective order, especially after recalling that the sequence incorporates 
the level of success. In case of strategic vehicles implementation capability and networking are 
the first two of three critical factors. This finding is aligned with Kanbach (2016) arguments of 
what are the main strategic objectives of a CAP. A good example for the importance of the first 
factor is: 
“How we measure success is the ability to integrate the startup into SAP, so, innovation and 
integration opportunities, customer interaction, customer pilot and the general awareness 
around their program.” (SAP.iO) 
The second, networking, is plausible since its value is mainly attributed to the exploitation of 
various opportunities which range from advice to collaboration up to the formation of business 
relationships (e.g. customers). In words of the experts: 
 “In a nutshell, the success for investments in promising startups lies in networking.” 
(Automotive) 
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“The network of entrepreneurs is essential, and its creation is one of the CAP’s main goals.” 
(Wayra) 
Selection criteria are the third most relevant factor. This is plausible since the ability to 
efficiently select the input of the process directly translates into the efficiency of the program’s 
output after taking the implementation capability into account (Kohler, 2016).  
In case of investment vehicles, the critical factors are identical to those of strategic vehicles, 
but in different order. Selection criteria are most important followed by implementation 
capability and networking (cf. Table 7).  
The second main finding relates to the differences between the two types of programs. The 
deviation regarding the implementation capability was expected to be larger between the two 
types of programs, since it is the main goal for strategic vehicles while they were assumed to 
be insignificant for investment vehicles. This was concluded since latter’s goal is exploitation 
rather than exploration (Kanbach, 2016). However, the programs in the sample of investment 
vehicles are not entirely focused on ROI but also on strategic aspects, which require a certain 
level of the resource implementation capability. This explains why the delta (cf. Table 6) is not 
as large as expected. The second largest difference lies in reputation (11%) which was given 
little importance by strategic vehicles (ranked #11 with 1%) and lots of importance for 
investment vehicles (ranked #4 with 12%).  
Surprisingly, the ranking of the value proposition is very low for strategic vehicles which 
resulted in the third largest delta compared to investment vehicles (cf. Table 6). The comment 
of a responded who didn’t want to get mentioned might offer a clue: 
“And it almost seems to me that there are some startups on the market who say that if they 
can't get any further with one accelerator, then they just go to the next.” (Censored) 
In this case a startup could participate in programs of strategic CAPs many times and benefit 
from free resources, mentoring and networking, which is not be possible for investment vehicles 
due to an increasing loss of shares. In consequence when choosing an investment vehicle’s 
program startups have an incentive to carefully select the program (by assessing its value 
proposition) as they are paying for it (equity) while this is not the case when choosing a strategic 
vehicle’s program. This lack of alignment of interests between startups and the corporation’s 
interests in CAPs of strategic vehicles has not been mentioned in literature before. However, 
this seems to be within the bounds of human behaviour, as abuse of free resources can be 
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observed in many cases and across all social classes (Feinberg, 1996). This should be subject 
to further research. 
The third main finding relates to the results of the RBV-analysis. In Table 6 it is shown that the 
top five criteria, which lead to a sustained- or temporary competitive advantage, represent 71% 
and 53% cumulative importance by the experts for strategic and investment vehicles, 
respectively. Success factors that lead to a temporary competitive advantage account for 12% 
and 7% while 30% and 46% of the answers for strategic and investment vehicles fall on factors 
which lead to no competitive advantage.2 This distribution seems optimizable when thinking 
about efficient usage of resources in accordance with the pareto principle (Harvey, 2018). 
5. Discussion und conclusion 
This study focused on assessing success factors for corporate accelerators and how they should 
be prioritized, since some will be more likely to lead to a competitive advantage of the 
incumbent firm than others. In the following section the meaning of the findings is discussed, 
and the research question answered. Theoretical implications of the findings are highlighted, 
and managerial implications derived.  
 
5.1. On which success factors should corporate accelerator programs focus to 
achieve sustained competitive advantage for its incumbent company? 
Barney states that a competitive advantage can be achieved if the firm possesses valuable 
resources that are rare amongst competitors and that can’t be imitated (Barney 1991). These 
resources have been identified in chapter 4 of this work using expert input. However, the 
question remains how these resources should be harnessed to best help the company who runs 
a corporate accelerator to achieve its goals. For strategic vehicles the three main goals are 
understanding current market developments and technology, integration of the products into 
the value chain and evaluation of disruptive innovation (Kanbach, 2016). To achieve this, the 
results of this work suggest focusing on the capability to implement the startups innovation, to 
create and maintain a strong network and to define and apply specific selection criteria. While 
this is already recognized by experts it is surprising that a large amount (30%) of importance is 
                                               
2 Note that sums may not add up to 100 due to rounding. 
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attributed to factors which don’t lead to a competitive advantage. It could be possible that 
corporate accelerators might still be experimenting in finding the right configuration of their 
program. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that 50% of all programs interviewed are less 
than two years old and reported to still be testing the concept (BSH, Viessmann, SAP.iO). 
Considering that the results of this work incorporate the success ratio of the programs it can be 
concluded that the programs should rather focus on the factors that lead to a competitive 
advantage rather than waste resources on those that don’t. While this is easy to say in theory 
the question remains how these resources should be distributed in the real world. Obviously, 
the success factors under study are a complex, intertwined system. The eleven factors are not 
mutually exclusive and probably neither collectively exhaustive. Therefore, it wouldn’t be 
reasonable to only focus on the top three criteria mentioned in the beginning and ignore the rest 
(e.g. defining a clear target or value proposition). A logical system needs to be created which 
allows the allocation of resources in such a way that the capacity of those which lead to a 
sustainable competitive advantage will be maximized while the those that don’t will be reduced 
to the necessary minimum. To suggest a more sensible way of distributing the resources 
amongst the eleven success factors, an analogy to the ABC-analysis, which is based on the 
pareto principle, is drawn. It is proposed that Group A, the top 3 success factors, would receive 
70% of the resources, group B (top 4 & 5) would receive 20% of the resources and lastly group 
C (the rest) would receive 10% of the resources (Ng, 2007). This would translate into following 
ranking when distributing evenly amongst factors of a category: 
 
Table 8: Proposed allocation of importance to the success factors, in imitation of the ABC-analysis. The set of factors is 
divided into three groups depending on their ability to deliver a sustainable competitive advantage (A), a temporary 
competitive advantage (B) or competitive parity (C). Then 70% of all capacity is allocated amongst category A, 20% 
amongst category B and 10% amongst category C. 
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While this high-level allocation of resource capacity seems of little practical use, it should still 
be a guideline for managers who are trying to design a program that will lead to a competitive 
advantage. The results revealed that successful CAPs which are strategic vehicles currently 
distribute their resources on a 71-12-30 (A-B-C) basis.3 While this implies that the resources 
that lead to sustainable competitive advantage already receive enough importance (e.g. through 
budget, time or effort) CAP managers don’t yet differentiation between group B and C. 
According to the results of this work a shift of resource intensity from group C to group B 
should improve the competitiveness temporarily. More tangible recommendations will be made 
in section 5.3.  
For investment vehicles the main goal lies in the generation of financial returns by investing in 
a startup and subsequently increasing its value through the participation in the program 
(Kanbach, 2016). The results of this work suggest that CAPs of this type should focus on the 
criteria they apply in order to select startups into the program, their capability to implement the 
startup’s innovation and the creation and maintenance of their professional network. However, 
these results should be taken somewhat cautiously. Due to the selection of CAPs in the sample, 
which are not purely financially motivated, that were clustered under “investment vehicles” the 
results might be a bit biased towards the strategic segment. This seems to be the case for the 
ability to implement a startups solution which has very little contribution to the generation of 
financial returns. A more homogenous selection of programs that fully claim to have no other 
intent than maximal ROI would have shown a different result. However, the increased 
importance of the ability to select the right startups for the program makes sense. A program 
that’s most interested in financial returns obviously has to select more rigorously than a program 
whose main intent is outside-in innovation. Regarding a better allocation of resources to reach 
a competitive advantage the same procedure is suggested that was proposed for strategic 
vehicles (cf. Table 8). Currently the distribution is 53-7-46 (A-B-C) which shows that both, 
class A and B resources are underrepresented which constitutes larger optimization potential 
for investment than for strategic vehicles. However, these results have to be processed 
somewhat cautiously as the CAPs of the sample also had strategic intentions and the difference 
in success factors’ perceived importance might be attributed to a certain extent to the differing 
goals of the programs. Still, some recommendations are subsequently made in section 5.3. 
 
                                               
3 The sum does not equal 100 due to rounding. 
38 | Page 
 
5.2. Theoretical implications 
First it should be noted that this thesis contributes to the body of literature by confirming that 
the factors which have already been identified in prior studies are of utmost importance for the 
success of a CAP, as validated through expert interviews in this thesis. 
Secondly, this work expands the body of literature by the identification of two not previously 
mentioned success factors (reputation and local proximity), that were identified through 
individual case study analysis.  
Thirdly, this thesis furthermore contributes to research on corporate accelerator programs by 
converting the success factors from a nominal scale to an ordinal scale for both types of 
programs. In this work a ranking has been established, based on the importance of the success 
factors grounded on expert's opinion as well as the actual success rates of the programs. 
Fourthly, the thesis recognized, which of the success factors should be prioritized when trying 
to achieve a competitive advantage for a program’s incumbent company by examining them 
through a resource-based view (Barney, 1991). 
Lastly, this work identified optimization potential for both types of programs and portrays 
managerial implications of the findings giving advice on how to optimize a corporate 
accelerator program on a high level as well as with specific, non-exhaustive examples to act 
upon.  
 
5.3. Managerial implications 
Optimization potential for strategic vehicles was identified by pulling investments from the 
factors from group C (reputation, value proposition, mutual value, target definition, local 
proximity and prior knowledge) and instead investing them in resources from group A and B 
that lead to a competitive advantage (cf. Table 8).  
Furthermore, to give some specific examples and initial inspiration on how the five identified 
success factors that lead to competitive advantage should be incorporated into the program’s 
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design a schematic representation of the phase of a general process4, in which these success 
factors are to be taken into account, is presented in Figure 4. The resources which lead to a 
sustained competitive advantage are highlighted in blue. Implementation capability can be 
leveraged by efficient means of communication between the startup cohort and the CAP-
manager as well as change management of stakeholders in the corporation. From the interviews 
it became obvious that change management is of utter importance to achieve cooperation from 
business units of the corporation who feel threatened or insulted by a startups solution.  
Selection criteria are essential. Alpha errors will lead to missed opportunities and beta errors 
will lead to sunk costs. It is recommended to define a clear KPI that describes the fit of a startup 
with the intentions of the corporation.  
Furthermore, the valuation process of each startup should be made as objectively as possible to 
eliminate human biases. It is consequently recommended to have a strict, structured process 
implemented to value each startup objectively.  
Networking is essential and should be implemented into every step of the program. This is 
already widely recognized. Some recommended measures are to anticipate networking needs 
of each startup from the start, to implement the capability to provide the needed networking 
contacts to the startup into the selection process and to use the contacts to the successfully 
accelerated startups to attract new promising startup candidates. Of course, many more 
recommendations can be thought of that result from specific situations. A one-fits-all solution 
is not applicable for CAPs. It is suggested, that the results of this thesis are used by managers 
to reflect upon their resource configuration and to find inspiration on how to possibly optimize 
their own program with the information provided. 
                                               
4 This process can be used for both, strategic- and investment vehicles depending on the deal’s structure. It can 
entail a money-for-equity agreement, a resources-for-equity agreement, a convertible loan agreement, or a non-
equity model (Goldstein 2014). 
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Figure 4: General CAP-process with success factors that lead to a sustained competitive advantage highlighted in blue. The 
bar indicates to which step of the process this factor is related to. 
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6. Limitation and future research 
Although the findings of this thesis have been produced on a best effort basis, they still should 
be treated with caution because of following limitations.  
The data collection involved considerable time and effort given the relatively new emerge of 
the phenomena, there is only a very limited number of CAPs existent worldwide fulfilling the 
definition (Heinemann, 2016; Ostertag, 2017). In addition, this is reinforced by the fact, that 
the few programs that have established themselves on the market, are rather reluctant when it 
comes to the public dissemination of valuable information like success factors and thus the 
recipe for their success. This led to the relatively small number of only 8 CAP programs in the 
sample, which results in problems of generalizability and thus must be extended in future 
research. Moreover, the success factors can only serve as a basis for future research and a 
quantitative analysis is strongly recommended as soon as this will be possible through a higher 
number of accelerator programs and more consistent data availability. Furthermore, the study 
sample contains programs from 3 different continents and 5 countries, which on the one hand 
portrays the global footprint of CAPs, but on the other hand limits the study, due to the fact, 
that even in times of globalisation, perceptions of success factors of respondents’ in the different 
geographical areas might differ strongly from each other due to cultural differences and thus 
might bias the results of this study.  
Further limitations are the missing quotes of interviewees for the success factors, which did not 
contribute to a sustainable competitive advantage. This has been done consciously to guarantee 
a practical length of this thesis. 
The emerging trend of corporate accelerators offer space for future research. The RBV, which 
has been applied in this study should be extended by the concept of dynamic capabilities (DC), 
to further investigate the CAP’s capability of integrating internal and external factors and 
reconfiguring resources (Teece et al., 1997). 
Furthermore, research needs were identified regarding the abuse of strategic CAPs by startups 
only for the purpose of obtaining free resources, as insinuated by an interviewed expert. The 
extent of this abuse should be quantified and the reasons for it investigated. Consequently, 
protective measures of CAPs should be derived that go beyond charging equity. 
  




Appendix 1: Overview of corporate accelerator programs in the sample of interviews conducted with detailed information 
about each. 








Interview guide – Semi-Structured Interview Questionnaire  
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Date:  ___/___/___ 
INTRODUCTION (5 Minutes) 
● Provide background of researcher 
● Identify the purpose of the research: Understand how corporate accelerators design programs to 
meet its goals. 
● Describe research involvement: 
§ Interview (30 minutes) 
§ Follow-up emails or phone conversations (if needed) 
§ Applicable internal reports or documents 
● Ask permission to begin recording the interview and have informant agreeing to participate in the 
study. 
● Outline the flow of the interview. The interview has three sections and uses both open and closed-
ended questions.  
 
SECTION ONE 
Context for setting an accelerator 
1. Of the start-ups within your CAP, what is usually the estimated ratio of success/failure? 
Do you have any threshold ratio? 
2. When selecting a candidate, what are the qualities your company is looking for? And 
what is the outcome? (for instance, is it technological (hard) innovation that can be 
developed within the company, or a cultural change (soft), or perhaps developing a 
culture of innovation?) 
 
SECTION TWO 
Answer the research question 
1. Can you tell me about how your company designed the CAP? What models, including 
those of other companies, did you consider when developing the CAP?  
2. As well as the value of the start-ups themselves, what are the mechanisms within your 
company that you consider are essential for success? How are these harnessed? How is 
synergy created? 
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Appendix 3: Interview guide used to conduct the interviews (Page 2/2). 
  
3. How can the mechanisms within your CAP be fine-tuned to deliver better outcomes for 
the company’s competitive advantage? 
4. What still needs to be done to achieve optimal ROI in your CAP?   
5. For investment CAP respondents: How do you calculate potential ROI on start-ups you 
will continue to support once the programme has ended? At what point and for what 
reasons might the company subsequently withdraw support? Has the company ever taken 
this step?    
6. For strategic CAP respondents: When selecting which start-ups to continue supporting, 
what mechanisms does the company have for absorbing them? Is the criteria based on 




             Follow up questions 
1. Do you have any more insights or comments upon any issues not covered in these 
questions that might help on my research?  
2. Please return to or elaborate further on any of the questions you consider particularly 
relevant.    
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